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RED APPLES AND GREEN PERSIMMONS:
A COMPARATrVE ANALYSIS OF AUDIO HOME-RECORDING




The economic viability of the recorded entertainment industry, certainly to
include the sound recording industry, depends on the protectability of its intellec-
tual property;' copyrights, after all, are the very lifeblood of the industry The
commercial "piracy ' 3 of sound recordings has been a significant problem at least
since the dawn of rock 'n' roll.' Non-commercial piracy--or private copying 5-
has grown to epidemic proportion with the coming of digital recording, 6 includ-
ing digital audiotape ("DAT") and the digital audio compact disk ("CD").' The
overall piracy of sound recordings is a multi-billion dollar, worldwide problem,9
and is getting worse.1°
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1. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital
Works, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 845, 846 (1997).
2. Id. at 846.
3. See David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy the Benefit of Improving
Technology, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 611, 622 (1995).
4. Id. at 621.
5. Private copying is the non-commercial copying of sound recordings...
for personal, domestic use ....
... It has resulted from the ready availability to the consumer from 1964 onwards of magnetic
[-]tape reproduction equipment, coupled with blank cassette tapes for use with such equipment....
The inducement to engage in private copying provided by such equipment far outweighs the individ-
ual consumers' awareness of and concern for the rights of copyright owners.
GILLIAN DAVIES & MICHELE E. HUNG, MUSIC AND VIDEO PRIVATE COPYING: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF THE
PROBLEM AND THE LAW I (1993).
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id.
8. Id. "The combination of a pre-recorded digital sound carrier such as a CD and a blank DAT provides
home copiers with a perfect master and a copying medium which permits infinite duplication of perfect copies
which equal the original."
9. See Don E. Tomlinson, Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The Piracy/Counterfeiting Problem and
Antipiracy andAnticounterfeiting Measures, 8 CURRENTs: It'L TRADE L.J. 3 (1999).
10. See ICC Spawns Formation of Multinational Anti-Counterfeiting Body, 10 No. 2 J. PRoPPRETARY RIGHTS
27 (1998). "Audio recording equipment is now a standard feature in households in all the industrialised [sic]
countries and multiple ownership of cassette recorders is very common." DAVIS & HUNG, supra note 5, at 28.
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Of the copyright "bundle of rights," it is the right of "reproduction"" that is
implicated. Digital technology calls into question the very efficacy of copyright
protection, 2 as eerily predicted by an Italian scholar writing in 1927: "[I]n the
hypothetical event that future events make reproductions a current and everyday
practice, [it] could be the death of copyright."'
3
In an effort to more fairly' compensate'" the royalty beneficiaries' 6 of sound
recording copyrights,"' some countries'8 have begun charging a subsidy on the
sale of blank audio recording media"9 and/or on the sale of home audio recording
equipment.2" The monies collected are pooled for distribution through what,
under any circumstances, is an imperfect system of determining how to "split the
pie.""' Any such pie-splitting inequities, however, pale in comparison to the
11. 17U.S.C. § 106(l)(1994).
12. See Don E. Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment as Intellectual Property on the Information
Superhighway: The Challenge of the Digital Domain, 6 STAN. L. & Pot'Y REv. 61 (1994).
13. E. Piola-Casselli, Trattato del dirino di autore e del contratto di edizione, U.T.E.T. TuRIN, 424 (1927),
quoted in DAVIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 2.
14. The question of the nature of the material recorded for private use has aroused a great deal of con-
troversy. On the one hand, the representatives of copyright owners . . . claim that what is being
copied is more or less exclusively their music, performances and productions and that they should
receive ... remuneration for such. .. use. On the other hand, consumer organisations [sic] and rep-
resentatives of blank tape and hardware manufacturers claim that people use blank tapes to make a
number of legitimate recordings such as business letters, recordings of family events and perfor-
mances ... by family members and that indiscriminately to impose a royalty on blank tapes and/or
on hardware would be unfair to those who make such recordings.
Davies & Hung, supra note 5, at 38.
[Another criticism] put forward against a royalty on blank tapes has been that many people record
their own CDs ... on cassettes to use in their car and that they would be penalised [sic] by such a
royalty, since they had already paid copyright royalties when purchasing the original recording and
[thus) would be required to pay a second time with the blank tape royalty.
. .. However, there is no doubt that the additional copy made in this way, for reasons of conve-
nience, represents an extended use and a new copy of the original music bought and it is [therefore]
reasonable to suggest that a royalty ... on blank tapes (and/or on hardware) should be paid to the
copyright owners for this additional facility and gain for the copier.
Id. at 52.
15. New technology should not alter [the copyright goal of providing economic incentives for the cre-
ation of new expression]. Rather, because [new technology] generally enables easier and faster
copying and distribution of creative intellectual and artistic works, it likewise intensifies the need to
extend the protection afforded by copyright to embrace these new uses of works of authorship.
D. Ladd, Private Use. Private Property and Public Policy: Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected
Works, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SOCIETY, 75 (1983), quoted in DAVIES & HUNG, supra note
5, at 2.
16. The United States law, for example, benefits record companies, featured recording artists, music pub-
lishers, songwriters, non-featured musicians and non-featured vocalists. 17 U.S.C. § 1006 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
17. In the context of this Article, terms such as "sound recording" and "sound recording copyrights" also
refer to the separate copyright in the underlying musical composition.
18. "An increasing number of countries have adopted the solution of a royalty.. . payable to right[s] owners
and calculated as a percentage of the selling price of blank tapes and/or recording equipment or as a flat fee."
DAvIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 16.
19. William I. Hochberg, Battle Royal-ty: The Multi-Billion Dollar Audio Home Taping Feud Between
Continental Europe and the US.-UK. Axis, 27 BEv. HILLS BAR Ass'N J. 157 (1993).
20. Id.
21. Since, in any given country, it would be literally impossible to know exactly how many units of a partic-
ular sound recording were sold over a given period and exactly how many times a particular sound recording
was publicly performed over that same period, royalty distribution is generally based on the next best thing: the
best sales data available and scientifically-conducted random sampling of public performances. The public per-
formance notion has been made somewhat problematic by the proliferation of music in cyberspace. See Don E.
Tomlinson & Timothy Nielander, Unchained Melody: Music Licensing in the DigitalAge, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 277, 290-92 (1998).
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greater fundamental problem concerning the basis upon which the United States,
in contrast to various other countries, generates the money pool. While the
United States collects money only for the sale of digital blank audio recording
media and digital home audio recording equipment," many other countries with
such laws collect money from the sale of digital and analog blank audio record-
ing media as well as home audio recording equipment.2
Internationally, this creates an inherent inequity for two reasons. First, the pool
of money collected in the United States for distribution internally and abroad is
considerably less than that in the other countries because the United States law
was enacted in 1992 and for some time into the future most blank audio record-
ing media and home audio recording equipment sold in the United States is and
will be analog, not digital," whereas the pool of money collected in the other
countries for distribution internally and abroad will cover both (effectively
meaning "all") types of blank audio recording media and home audio recording
equipment." Second, inequities arise because American sound recordings sold
and publicly performed" in the other countries will account for a greater propor-
tion of the distribution than will foreign recordings sold and publicly performed
in the United States. 7
As a result, there is considerable disagreement over whether United States
sound-recording copyright owners should benefit from this unequal situation.28
There are two logical bases for deciding how any country might include foreign
claimants in the disbursement of the royalty pool: national treatment 29 or recipro-
cal treatment."0 In virtually all the countries with such laws, the national treat-
ment principle is used-likely because various international copyright treaties to
which these countries are signatories require the use of the national treatment
plan.3 The effect of this situation is that the United States is benefiting
immensely-in the sense that it pays far fewer royalties to the other countries
(because it collects for digital processes only) while receiving the benefit of roy-
alties collected in the other countries derived both from digital and analog
processes. The United States does apply the national treatment principle to the
money it collects,' but the money collected is a paltry sum compared to what it
22. William 1. Hochberg, Tracking International Tape Royalties; US. Seeks to Get in Synch, LEADER
PUBLICATIONS, Apr. 1993, at 3, available in LEXIS, Academic Universe, Document File.
23. See id.; Hochberg, supra note 19, at 157.
24. Hochberg, supra note 19, at 157.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. There is a rather obvious domestic inequity as well. Since United States consumers pay the levy
only on digital recording media and home recording equipment, the pool of money collected for domestic dis-
tribution is much less than it would be if analog recording media and home recording equipment were also
taxed. This particular problem, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
28. Id. at 158.
29. Benefits under a particular law in a particular country which apply to the citizens of that country are
extended to the citizens of other countries, regardless of reciprocity. See DAVIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 215.
30. Benefits under a particular law in a particular country which apply to the citizens of that country are not
extended to the citizens of any other country unless the other country has a similar law that extends benefits to
the citizens of the first country, i.e., benefits under the law of the first country are reciprocal in nature. Id. at
217.
31. Id. at 215.
32. Id. at 217.
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would be if analog tape and recording equipment were a part of the royalty equa-
tion.
Part II of this Article discusses the problem of consumer sound-recording pira-
cy, particularly in light of recent technological developments. Part III surveys
private copying laws worldwide and specifically examines the audio home-
recording laws of Germany and the United States. Part IV discusses the relevant
economic, trade and cultural considerations as between the United States and the
other countries with such laws. Finally, Part V recommends that the United
States Audio Home Recording Act be amended to bring it in line with prevailing
international views on the subject. Such amendment would end the royalty-dis-
tribution problem between the other countries and the United States because all
countries would then be proceeding from the same starting point.
II. PIRACY MEETS TECHNOLOGY
A. Worldwide Consumer Piracy of Sound Recordings
It has been said that there are three types of sound recording pirates3 -profes-
sional pirates, consumer pirates and Internet pirates." Professional pirates are
those having no regard for the law or morality of the situation, and who have
large economic ideas."5 Consumer pirates seem to view themselves as moral,
law-abiding citizens, but, at the same time, they seem to believe that pirating
sound recordings is neither illegal nor immoral.," Clearly, they have small eco-
nomic ideas. Internet pirates, perhaps the newest category of pirate on the intel-
lectual property landscape, seem to be placing copyrighted materials on the
Internet-to be downloaded, used, and/or enjoyed by other "surfers"-for the
33. There are other forms of intellectual property pirates in the journalism and entertainment industries.
This Article, however, concerns only sound recordings.
34. See Tomlinson, supra note 12, at 66-67.
35. The annual loss of intellectual property revenue to professional pirates in the United States is mea-
sured in the billions of dollars, and the revenue loss internationally is estimated to be in the tens of
billions of dollars. Statutory protection of authorship by the United States has little real value if pro-
fessional pirates remain undeterred from reproducing copyrighted matter at will. The copyrights of
the journalism and entertainment industries are among the most pirated. And the same innovative
technologies used to enhance the quality and disseminability of these copyrighted works facilitate
their theft. Given the nature of copyrighted matter, these new technologies have made uncovering
piracy difficult and, even when uncovered, quite difficult to punish through the civil courts.
Id. at 66 (citing Erich Fleishman, The Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv.
45(1988)).
36. Consumer pirates usually do not believe they are doing anything wrong. Without doubt, the grea-
test obstacle that copyright owners must overcome is the consumer pirate's attitude that copyright
infringement carries no moral implications. The ease of replication introduced with digital technol-
ogy will exacerbate the problem to the extreme. Americans are accustomed to infringing copyrights
by simple copying, and polls show that the public believes copying of protected works is morally
acceptable. If copyright owners wish to preserve and enhance their copyrights in the digital age,
they will have to change the public attitude toward piracy.
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sheer joy of doing it.37 They too seem to believe that such infringement is neither
illegal nor immoral; preferring instead to view the Internet as an "anything goes"
kind of place-something like the Old West in American history.38 In general,
they seem to have no economic ideas at all. Of these forms of piracy, it is con-
sumer piracy, more specifically the "home taping" problem, with which this
Article deals."
In the context of the sound-recording industry, although neither the United
States Supreme Court'" nor Congress has ever so stated, most observers histori-
cally would draw some distinction between consumer pirates and "home
recorders." A "home recorder" may be thought of as someone who buys a CD,
takes it home, and makes one copy to use for her own enjoyment when the origi-
nal unit is lost or has become defective." The home recorder, however, may
become a consumer pirate if she buys a CD, takes it home, makes copies and
gives or sells them to her friends.'2 (Congress does not consider non-commercial
home recording to be an infringment' 3-- without indicating whether it was
infringing in the past, or infringing but negated by the "fair use" defense.)
Worldwide, the sound recording industry loses billions of dollars per year to
pirates."
B. The Analog and Digital Technologies
Analog technology has been in use since the inception of audio'" and involves
an electronic signal made up of waveforms.' 6 When these waveforms are record-
ed originally onto audiotape and then transferred to another piece of audiotape,
the waveforms lose some of their original strength.'7 With each generational
loss, the resulting quality is diminished, eventually to the point of unuseability.'
Digital technology has fundamentally changed electronic sound recordings
with regard to generational signal degradation.' 9 In digital audiotape copying
37. One of the main distinctions between professional copyright pirates and consumer copyright
pirates is that professional infringers have large economic goals and consumer infringers have small
ones. Neither economic extreme, however, seems to describe the form of infringement now taking
place in cyberspace. On the Internet and on the networks that comprise the Internet, users routinely
deposit copyrighted materials, not for economic gain, but because they enjoy the process and
because they simply do not believe that placing copyrighted music, pictures and computer software
on the Internet constitutes piracy.
Id at 67.
38. See Michael Meyer, Stop! Cyberthiefi, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 36.
39. "The reasons put forward by consumers for private copying have not changed significantly over the ...
years. The two main reasons given [in surveys] for copying music are [the ability to make] personal selections
of particular works and price considerations . taping is much cheaper than buying pre-recorded music."
DAVIES & HuNG, supra note 5, at 55.
40. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
41. See Tomlinson, supra note 12, at 66.
42. Id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
44. See Tomlinson, supra note 9, at 3.
45. See John Rousell, Digital Audio, in COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY UPDATE 191 (August E. Grant &




49. Id. at 191-92.
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there is no loss of quality from generation to generation because the source sig-
nal is not being copied to the resulting audiotape as is the case with analog tech-
nology"0 The resulting audiotape, through the digital process, is being fed binary
computer information; it is a mathematical re-creation, not a transference."1 At
some point, magnetic audiotape will be superseded by solid-state storage sys-
tems. 2 "It is the capacity for making identical duplicates and for serial copying
that makes digital recording equipment substantially different from analogue
[sic] recording methods." 3 Ironically, one of the digital technology's break-
throughs-the lack of generational signal degradation-has exacerbated the
problem of sound recording piracy.
III. AUDIO HOME-RECORDING LAWS
A. Worldwide
During the past decade, many European 4 and other countries have adopted
legislation"5 to benefit sound recording copyright owners" by taxing blank audio
recording media and/or consumer audio recording equipment.57  Germany, in
1965, was the first European country to do so.' Countries which tax blank audio
recording media and/or consumer audio recording equipment include: Australia,
Austria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Gabon, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kenya, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Slovak, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Apparently,
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Don E. Tomlinson, Computer Manipulation and Creation of Images and Sounds: Assessing the
Impact, THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM 10 (1993).
One must be sensitive to the warnings of the German [g]overnment that recording technology may
change so that recording machines with permanent integral recording storage may replace the pre-
sent type of machine that requires tape or other such material as a recording medium. If such a
development is likely, it would seem wise to adopt a machine levy from the beginning rather than be
forced to convert to one in the future as technology changes.
D. Maagnusson & V Nabhan, Exemptions under the Canadian Copyright Act, CONSUMER AND CORPORATE
AFFAIRS (1983), quoted in DAVIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 225.
53. DAVIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 75.
54. While there has been talk (and even a draft) of a European Commission Directive on the subject of pri-
vate copying, it has not happened.
If... right[s] owners are granted a right to remuneration in return for freedom for members of the
public to make single copies of sound ... recordings for their personal use, then this amounts to a
compulsory license and must be recognised [sic] as a specific exception to the reproduction right
which is fundamental to copyright protection. The control of both piracy and private copying
depends on the exercise of the reproduction right of... right[s] owners ....
Id. at 271.
55. There are two schools of thought on how to distribute the compensation that would go to rights owners.
One is based on "lost sales," the other on "use." Id. at 57.
56. "The majority of consumers have been found, in many [European] surveys, to support ... private copy-
ing royalties as a solution to the home-taping problem. [This suggests] that consumers, contrary to popular
belief, accept the justice of a royalty system"' Id. at 64.
57. See Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992: A Critical Analysis, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & EN-r. L.J. 311, 330-31 (1994). "The amount of royalties
levied under these countries' laws varies widely, as does the breakdown of royalty distribution among the vari-
ous claimants. Additionally, the basis for the blank tape royalties (i.e., recording time, flat rate per tape, etc.)
varies." Id.
58. See DAVIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 116.
59. Id. at 116-214.
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Canada6" and Japan 6 have also enacted such laws. Others, such as Argentina,
Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland and the United Kingdom may have
done so.2
Most of these countries pay royalties to foreign claimants on a national treat-
ment basis, but at least two-Finland and Denmark-pay foreign claimants on a
reciprocal basis. Since the United States law applies only to blank digital audio
recording media and to digital home audio recording equipment, while all the
other laws apply to digital and analog, United States sound recording copyright
owners would lose perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue now being
collected from the other countries if these other states have a collective change of
heart on the subject of foreign royalty-that is, distribution by reciprocity rather
than by national treatment. For whatever reason, no nation has as yet chosen to
retaliate "in-kind" against the United States by switching to reciprocally-based
treatment.
A good question, of course, is why the United States law is so different from
the other laws. The answer may be that until the digital technology with its "per-
fect copy" capability came along, Congress had never been persuaded that "poor
quality" analog copying was a significant loss to the sound recording industry.
64
"[T]he Europeans [, however,] disagree, arguing that many consumers do not
really appreciate the difference between analog and digital recordings, or at least
don't care enough to refrain from home taping with analog equipment to the tune
of billions of dollars in lost... revenues annually.""
B. The United States Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA")," rather than being a bold
pronouncement by Congress on a subject of great importance, is more in the
nature of a settlement agreement" between the sound recording industry and the
manufacturers of blank digital audio recording media and digital home audio
recording equipment.' The first major component of AHRA concerns electronic
safeguards against digital copies being made from first and later-generation digi-
tal copies. This component is called the Serial Copy Management System
("SCMS").6 ' All home digital recording equipment imported or sold in the
United States must contain the SCMS computer chip.70 While SCMS is not a
60. See John Geddes, Record Industry Seeks Higher Blank-Tape Royalty, THE FINANCIAL POST, Dec. 31,
1994, at 1.
61. See New Copyright Law To Allow Surcharge, THE DAILY YoMiU, Oct. 30, 1992, at 2.
62. See DAvIES & HUNG, supra note 5, at 116-214.
63. Id. at 132, 185.
64. Id.
65. Hochberg, supra note 19, at 158.
66. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
67. See Calm v. Sony Corp., 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Because the stakes were so high on both sides,
the two industry segments chose "the bargaining table to hammer out the blueprint for the [AHRA]" rather than
risking an adverse court decision. Id. See also, Hochberg, supra note 19, at 157.
68. See McKuin, supra note 57, at 325. See also, Christine C. Carlisle, The Audio Home Recording Act of
1992, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 335 (1994).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
70. Id. § 1002.
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panacea (because, for example, one could theoretically make an infinite number
of DAT copies from one CD), it does seem to solve the problem of exponential
generational piracy-"perfect" digital copies being made from digital copies that
are one or more generations removed from the original CD.
The second major component of AHRA mandates that royalties be collected on
blank digital audio recording media and on digital home audio recording equip-
ment,"1 that such royalties be deposited into the United States Treasury,72 and that
the copyright royalty panel, convened from time to time by the Librarian of
Congress, act as the disbursing agent." The royalty on blank digital audio
recording media is three percent of the import value or of the domestic manufac-
turer's FOB price to wholesalers." The royalty on digital home audio recording
equipment is two percent of the import value or of the domestic manufacturer's
FOB price to wholesalers, including a minimum royalty of $1.00 and a maxi-
mum royalty of $8.00 per machine. 5 For digital home audio recording devices
that contain, for example, dual recording decks, the maximum royalty is
$12.00.7" Once the money is collected into the royalty pool, it is distributed to
approved claimants" as follows: record companies 38.83%; featured recording
artists 25.59%; music publishers 16.66%; songwriters 16.66%; non-featured
musicians 1.75%; and non-featured yocalists 0.92%.
The third major component of AHRA counterbalances the royalty system by
prohibiting sound-recording copyright infringement actions of a non-commercial
nature. 9 In other words, home recorders are free to home record. In this regard,
AHRA draws no distinction between digital audio home recording and analog
audio home recording." Finally, AHRA, without specifically so stating, uses the
"national treatment" method by including foreign claimants in the disbursement
of the royalty pool.8"
Regulations promulgated by the Copyright Office include: 1) a provision
requiring distributors of digital audio recording devices82 and media to obtain a
statutory license from the Copyright Office;' 2) a provision requiring annual
"Statements of Account" to be filed and royalty fees submitted to the Copyright
71. Id. § 1004.
72. Id. § 1005.
73. Id. § 1006 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
74. Id. § 1004(b).
75. Id. § 1004(a).
76. Id. § 1004(a)(3).
77. Id. § 1007(a)(2).
78. Id. § 1006(b); Distribution of the 1992, 1993, and 1994 Musical Works Fund, 62 Fed. Reg. 6558-01
(1997).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
80. Id. § 1008.
81. Id. §§ 1006-1007.
82. One lawsuit has resulted from differences of opinion over what constitutes a digital audio recording
device. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that Diamond Multimedia's Rio MP3 music player is not a digital audio recording device and therefore not
subject to the AHRA). "The Rio is a consumer electronics device with headphones that allows a user to down-
load [record] MP3 audio files from a computer and listen to them elsewhere." Mike Blevins, et al., Home
Recording Rights Coalition <www.hrrc.org/CEMARIO-PR> (visited Aug. 24, 1999).
83. 37 C.FR. § 201.27(a) (1998).
[VOL. 20:5
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Office by distributors;8" 3) a provision granting access to royalty pool informa-
tion by "interested copyright parties;""5 and 4) a provision prescribing the proce-
dures whereby interested copyright parties entitled to royalty payments can claim
them."8
The first pool of United States money became available for claims by artists
and record companies in late 1994.87 These two groups have formed a not-for-
profit organization called the Alliance of Artists & Recording Companies
("AARC").as The AARC's first claim resulted in a pool of $350,000 to divide
among its members." Songwriters and music publishers are paid from a separate
pool."0 Conceding that the $350,000 amount was relatively small, Linda Bocchi,
the Executive Director of the AARC, said: "As with any emerging technology,
we expect the pool to start small and grow over time.""' No evidence was found
on the subject of whether any foreign entities made claims against any United
States revenue pool.
C. The German Private Copying Law
The German private copying law is codified as a section of the general copy-
right law. 2 Article 54(1) of this law states: "Where the nature of a work makes it
probable that it will be reproduced by the... transfer from one ... audio record-
ing medium to another in accordance with Article 53(1) or (2), the [rights' hold-
er] of the work shall be entitled to payment of equitable remuneration." 3 Article
54(1) also specifies that the remuneration shall be compensated through the col-
lection of royalties from the sale of blank audio recording media and audio home
recording equipment.' Originally, only recording equipment was taxed; record-
ing media was added by amendment in 1985."s Importantly, and in contrast to
United States law, the German audio home recording law collects royalties on
analog as well as digital audio tape and recording equipment.9 "
It is the manufacturers and importers of blank audio recording media and audio
home recording equipment who are liable for payment of the royalty. 7 The bene-
ficiaries are the various rights holders under German copyright law, including the
authors, performers and producers of the sound recording.
9 8
84. Id. § 201.28(a) (1998).
85. Id. § 201.29(a) (1998).
86. Id. § 259.1 (1998).






92. See DAvIEs & HUNG, supra note 5, at 128-37 (discussing German copyright law).
93. Id. at 130. Article 53(l) permits the making of single copies of a work for personal use and Article
53(2) permits the making of single copies for such as scientific use. Id. at 129.
94. Id. at 130.
95. Id. at 131.
96. As far as could be determined, the German law is silent on the subject of the analog versus the digital
technology. Since the German law originally was enacted in 1965 when digital recordation was not yet in exis-
tence or even foreseen (at the consumer level), the digital technology apparently was non-controversially sub-
sumed into the operation of the law once digitalization became a reality.
97. See DAvIEs & HUNG, supra note 5, at 130.
98. Id.
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The amount payable per audio home recording device is DM 2.50," and the
amount payable per hour of blank audio recording media is DM 0.12.1"' The
amount payable per audio home recording device that records without benefit of
a separate tape is DM 5.00.101 Claims for compensation under the law may be
made only through a "collecting society" and not directly by rights holders.0 2
The society created in Germany for the collection and disbursement of these
funds is "Zentralstelle fur Private Uberspielungs Rechte" or "ZPU."1 3 It is run
by representatives from each group of rights holders.' The sharing formula in
Germany, which is achieved by rights-holder group negotiations rather than spec-
ified by law, is 27% to performers, 15% to producers, 42% to musical authors,
and 16% to literary authors (lyricists)."' As with all copyright-type collecting
societies, the distribution scheme is immensely complicated but generally based
on statistics relating to sales and public performances of recorded music.'
There are no criminal penalties for non-payment by manufacturers and
importers, but the civil remedies include damages and injunctive relief."7
IV ECONOMIC, TRADE RELATIONS AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Economically, the sound recording (and video) industries constitute an increas-
ingly larger share of the United States Gross National Product"0 and should not,
therefore, be taken lightly. There are various factors in the "trade relations"
realm that bear on this problem. For instance, there is the "cultural debasement"
problem. Perhaps partially underlying any European change of heart in this situ-
ation is a matter that has less to do with revenue than with a strong desire for cul-
tural preservation.
"The Europeans are operating under a number of emotional and practical con-
siderations," says Don Biederman, senior vice president of legal and business
affairs at Wamer/Chappel Music, Inc. "Many of them perceive a cultural inva-
sion from us and fear the debasement of their indigenous cultures." There is no
question that American entertainment-music, film and television--dominates
world culture much as Roman and Greek culture permeated the outlying realms
during the height of those civilizations." 9
Also, there is the problem that America's musical acts have long since domi-
nated Europe vis-a-vis units sold and sound-recording public performances,
whereas European groups or solo artists far less often make it near or to the top
99. Id. at 131.
100. Id.
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102. Id. at 132.
103. Id. at 132-33.
104. Id. at 133.
105. Id. at 131.
106. Id. at 133-34.
107. Id. at 135.
108. "[These industries) contributed more [in 1989] to the [Gross National Product] than either the construc-
tion industry or the agriculture, mining and energy extraction industries combined." Id. at 27.
109. Hochberg, supra note 19, at 158.
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of the United States music charts. " "Add to this state of affairs the fact that bar-
riers exist with respect to foreign entertainment permitted into the highly lucra-
tive American markets, and one begins to understand the scope of the situa-
tion." ''
Another policy consideration that aggravates AHRA's lack of comparability
with its European counterparts is that "it is not an immutable law of nature that
English-language pop music will dominate forever. The taste of the general pub-
lic changes over the years." '
V CONCLUSIONS
Very little argues in favor of leaving the AHRA as it presently exists. It is
understandable that the manufacturers of blank digital (and analog) audio record-
ing media and digital (and analog) home audio recording equipment would be
opposed to any kind of additional overhead burden, but the simple fact is that it
is consumers who ultimately should and would pay this freight. Since any levy
applies equally to all manufacturers, what is it that the manufacturers so fear?
There seems to be no evidence that any such levy would affect consumer buying
practices in any way.
A law that includes digital and excludes analog has two problems in relation to
foreign sound-recording copyright owners. First, there seemingly is little to
claim from United States coffers. Second, United States claimants have much to
claim abroad. The downside to United States claimants is that the United States
practice could result in the exclusion of United States copyright owners from
hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign earnings over the coming years if reci-
procity becomes the standard imposed on the United States by other countries
(not to mention that domestically the United States law leaves the huge analog
market unaccounted for). Further, other countries might choose economic retali-
ation against United States intellectual property interests in other ways. Whether
these inequities will result in any type of retaliation against the United States is,
of course, uncertain. For its part, United States thinking could be that there is no
international inequity in this situation because of the gross piracy of United
States intellectual property abroad (even if the countries with audio home record-
ing laws generally are not the problem "pirate" nations). At any rate, all such
problems easily could be remedied by amending current law to cover analog
sound recordings as well as digital sound recordings. Some public policy prob-
lems defy solution; this one does not.
I10. d. at 157.
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